

~~SECRET...REL USA, AUS, GBR~~



# Iraq Update

## 21 April 2006

HOW I SEE SIT  
HOW EVOLVING  
⇒ HOW IMPACTS  
WAY AHEAD V/NEW  
GOVT AND  
CURRENT PLANS

UP 4 ISSUES

This briefing is classified

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~~REL USA, AUS, GBR~~

Derived from: Multiple sources


DECL ON: 20 Apr 2016

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## Situation

- Sectarianism will remain part of the strategic landscape and will complicate the accomplishment of our strategic objectives over the next several years.
- “Tit for Tat” sectarian violence will continue; AQIZ will continue to work to foment sectarian violence.
- Population movements have slowed, but will continue on a small scale.
- Pressures of government formation, on-going sectarian violence, lagging basic needs, and weak economic development will make it harder for the new government to generate momentum.
- The Sunni population is currently participating in the political process and may be recalculating their alternatives, with respect to the insurgency.
- Army development on track; police development progressing, but police loyalty questionable in some areas.
- Signals from Sadr mixed; improving capability for rapid action.
- New government will likely exercise their sovereignty more; will press for “Way Ahead” on coalition presence and detainees.




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# Iraq Security Force Assumption of Lead



Apr 06 TRA Data




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# Provincial Iraqi Control: April Assessment and Projections

## April Assessment



## Provincial Iraqi Control Projections

	Sulaymaniyah
JUN 06	Al Muthanna
JUN 06	Maysan
AUG 06	Dhi Qar
SEP 06	An Najaf
JUN 06	Dahuk
SEP 06	Diyala
SEP 06	Irbil
SEP 06	Karbala
OCT 06	Al Qadisiyah
OCT 06	Babil
OCT 06	Salah Ad Din
NOV 06	Wasit
DEC 06	At Tamim
JAN 07	Al Basrah
FEB 07	Ninawa
FEB 07	Baghdad
MAR 07	Al Anbar

*This is the first full assessment on progress towards Provincial Iraqi Control; the assessment process is maturing and projections will change in the future.*

~~SECRET~~ //REL MCFI



## Issue #1: Short Term Presence

Government Program Point 5: "To work to safeguard the sovereignty of Iraq . . . realize the internal requisites according to an objective timetable so that Iraqi forces assume the security tasks completely and end the mission of MNF-I"

- Expect pressure to show some plan for the withdrawal of MNF-I
- Should be prepared to talk short term plans (through 2007) in the first few months of the government

### ■ Key Points

- Use ISF development timelines and conditions-based approach to show "Way Ahead" without a fixed timetable

- Discuss the authorities MNF-I will continue to require

- "SOFA-like" protections

- Article 98 agreement

- Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

- Consider "state to state" agreement for conflict termination

US - UK - TM

Ilizam Mushtarak - United Commitment

~~SECK. //REL MCFT~~



## Issue #2: Detainees

**Government Program Point 31:** *"Form a governmental committee to follow up detainee cases . . . activate the judicial procedures . . . encouraging the Iraqi and international organizations to follow up detainee files, visiting the detainee centers, and meeting the detainees without impediments"*

- Expect pressure to show some plan for the handover of detainees to the Iraqis
- Should be prepared to talk short-term plans (through 2007) in first few months of new government — *we*
- Key Points:
  - Release program tied to government reconciliation initiatives
    - Current standing process to release low-risk detainees (20%)
    - Can accept some risk on medium risk detainees (35%); High Risk Detainees (45%) held for reconciliation agreement
  - Ongoing issues include: Iraqi legal authorities to hold security detainees, MEK, and refoulement agreements
- Also expect to get pressed to conform to Iraqi Constitutional requirements for arrest and detention

*US-UK TMS.*

~~SECRET~~ //REL MCFI




## Issue #3: Long Term Presence

- Useful to begin discussing programs that signal appropriate long term relationships between USG and GOI
- Security guarantees
- FMF funding
- Don't expect Iraqi interest initially in the long term
- Basing and long term presence discussions should follow in time

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# Issue # 4 Force Structure Update



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## Way Ahead

- USG needs to prepare itself to address key policy issues with new Iraqi government shortly after their entry into office. *START THINKING ABOUT THE "MO"*
- While progress of Iraqi Security Forces remains on track, delay in government formation, on-going sectarian violence, and threat posed by Shi'a-based militias increases the period of uncertainty and risk.
- MNF-I planning to go from 15 to 14 US combat brigades in Iraq by Jun 06 (potentially to 13 US combat brigades by Aug 06), but conditions are causing restructuring plan to shift to the right.
- Will involve accepting MODERATE risk in Ninewa Province.
- Too early to decide on next force structure steps until we see nature of new GoI and determine full impact of sectarian violence / militia threat.

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**Backup**

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## Key Transition Assumptions

- The insurgency will remain active, but will not expand beyond the current six provinces.
- The political process can diminish the Sunni Rejectionist component of the insurgency.
- Growth of ISF capability will remain on track.
- Shi'a Rejectionist violence can be contained with local security efforts.
- Coalition members will remain committed at close to current levels through 2006.
- 1.4b, 1.4d Iraq, but remain deterred from direct action.
- MNF-I presence is a factor in Sunni Rejectionist violence.

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## **Conditions**

### **(5 Jan 06 Tank Briefing)**

- Formation of a representative Iraqi government by Spring 2006.
- Political process and Sunni engagement diminishes violence to level that the ISF can contain (with Coalition support) in affected areas.
- Threat of sectarian / militia-led violence remains low.
- Iraqi Army / Police development continues near projected levels; ISF assuming battlespace are consistently able to hold it.
- Iraqis assume greater security responsibility for Baghdad; improved security in the other 9 key cities
- Sustained success in Mosul, Tal Afar, Western Euphrates River Valley, and border regions.
- Security ministries continue to improve and can sustain forces with Coalition support.
- No expansion of US battlespace due to Coalition reductions.

SECDEF

① HADITH

② SOVEREIGNTY / SPEED UP TRANSFER  
COOP TO W/O

③ NTL VIOITY - ESTABLISHMENT

④ REINTEGRATION

⑤ DETAILERS

⑥ MINISTERS

- PRT U/D

- SEC POL WITH ATTACH - 2006 USCA

- ESTABLISH POL WITH ATTACH  
ITL SUIT FOR PROCESS

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# *Iraqi Security Forces Update*

*26 April 2006*


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## ***Bottom Line Up Front***

- **Force generation, ministry development, and professionalization on track**
- **Areas of notable progress**
  - ✓ **Financial transition in MoD**
  - ✓ **Logistics concept in MoD**
  - ✓ **Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs)**
  - ✓ **Evolution of the National Police**
- **Areas of notable lack of progress**
  - ✓ **Inability of MoD to obligate capital expenditure budget**
  - ✓ **Inability of MoI to obligate infrastructure budget**

## *MNSTC-I Lines of Operations*





***Build and Sustain MoD Institutional Capability***

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## Build and Sustain Institutional Capability

### Notable Progress in the Ministry of Defense

#### ▪ MoD Financial Transition

	MNSTC-I Funded Life Support Cost	MoD Funded Life Support Cost
06 March 2006	78.3%	21.7%
26 April 2006	38.1%	61.9%

#### ▪ NCO Promotions

	Monthly Promotions
06 March 2006	0
26 April 2006	2,873
<b>Total Change</b>	<b>2,873</b>

#### ▪ Command and Control

- ✓ Iraqi Joint Forces Command Operations Center fully operational
- ✓ Iraqi Ground Forces Command Operations Center begins operations—May 06
- ✓ National Command and Control Exercise—May 06



## ***Build and Sustain Institutional Capability***

### ***Notable Progress in the Ministry of Defense***

- ***Logistics Concept***
  - ✓ ***Approved by Minister***
  - ✓ ***7 of 9 Motor Transport Regiments formed or forming***
  - ✓ ***5 of 5 Regional Support Units formed***
  - ✓ ***Repair parts to battalion unit level by June***
- ***Communications***
  - ✓ ***7 of 16 Iraqi Defense Network (IDN) nodes installed for data transfer***
  - ✓ ***Long-range communications to battalion level by June***
- ***Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs)***
  - ✓ ***17 battalions formed***
  - ✓ ***9 completed training***
  - ✓ ***8 in training***
  - ✓ ***85% equipped by June***



## ***Build and Sustain Institutional Capability***

### ***Notable Lack of Progress in the Ministry of Defense***

#### ***Inability of MoD to Obligate Capital Expenditures Budget***

	<b><i>Funds Available (Millions)</i></b>	<b><i>Funds Programmed (Millions)</i></b>	<b><i>Funds Committed (Millions)</i></b>
<b><i>06 March 2006</i></b>	<b><i>\$868</i></b>	<b><i>\$370</i></b>	<b><i>\$0</i></b>
<b><i>26 April 2006</i></b>	<b><i>\$868</i></b>	<b><i>\$370</i></b>	<b><i>\$0</i></b>

***Currently working to get Gol to request establishment of an FMS  
Master Case with USG for capital expenditures (\$500M)***



***Build and Sustain MoI Institutional Capability***

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## ***Build and Sustain Institutional Capability***

### ***Notable Progress in the Ministry of Interior***

- ***Approval of the Strategic Framework***
  - ✓ ***Provides Strategic Vision***
  - ✓ ***Assigns responsibility and delegates authority***
  - ✓ ***Establishes effective business practices***
- ***Evolution of the National Police***
  - ✓ ***Combined Public Order and Commando Brigades***
  - ✓ ***1,142 Sunni integrated in April***
  - ✓ ***Building public confidence***
- ***Implementation of e-Ministry network***
  - ✓ ***Improves accountability***
  - ✓ ***Increases efficiency of processes***



## ***Build and Sustain Institutional Capability***

### ***Notable Lack of Progress in the Ministry of Interior***

#### ***Inability of Mol to Commit Infrastructure Budget***

	<b><i>Funds Available (Millions)</i></b>	<b><i>Funds Committed (Millions)</i></b>
<b><i>06 March 2006</i></b>	\$26	\$0
<b><i>26 April 2006</i></b>	\$26	\$0

***Currently working with Mol Planning Directorate and Ministry of Construction to commit funds against 11 projects***



***Generate Capable ISF***

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## Generate Capable ISF

### Notable Progress in Force Generation

• Force Generation			
	Ministry of Defense Forces	Ministry of Interior Forces	Total
06 March 2006	112,900	127,700	240,600
26 April 2006	115,100	134,900	250,000
Total Growth	2,200	7,200	9,400
• Battlespace Transition			
	Army Battalions	Police Battalions	Total
06 March 2006	43	6	49
26 April 2006	52	6	58
Total Growth	9	0	9
• Border Transition			
	Border Police	Border Forts	
06 March 2006	20,000	212	
26 April 2006	20,800	248	
Total Growth	800	36	



## ***Generate Capable ISF***

### **Notable Lack of Progress in Force Generation**

- ***Difficulty recruiting IPS and IA in Al Anbar***
  - ✓ ***High illiteracy rate***
  - ✓ ***Intimidation***

***Currently working on an in-service education program with both security ministries***



***Develop Professional ISF***

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## *Develop Professional ISF*

### *Notable Progress in the Ministry of Defense*

- *Professional Education System*
  - ✓ *Since 06 March 2006 graduated:*

	<i>Graduates</i>
<i>Iraqi Military Academy at Rustamiyah</i>	<i>100</i>
<i>Zahko Military Academy</i>	<i>393</i>
<i>Qualchalon Military Academy</i>	<i>87</i>
<i>Recalled Officer Training</i>	<i>736</i>
<i>Recalled NCO Training</i>	<i>953</i>
<i>Total Graduates</i>	<i>2,269</i>

- *Center for Leadership and Ethics established at Ar Rustamiyah—March 06*



## ***Develop Professional ISF***

### ***Notable Lack of Progress in the Ministry of Defense***

- ***Lack of military justice system (UCMJ)***
- ***Lack of functioning retirement policy***

- ***Draft UCMJ awaiting approval by CoR***
- ***Retirement law passed 27 January 2006 but not implemented***



## *Develop Professional ISF*

### *Notable Progress in the Ministry of Interior*

- *Professional Education System*
  - ✓ *Since 06 March 2006 graduated:*

	<i>Graduates</i>
<i>JIPTC</i>	<i>1,470</i>
<i>Baghdad Police College</i>	<i>2,119</i>
<i>Officer Tactical Leader Course</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>Total Graduates</i>	<i>3,601</i>



## *Develop Professional ISF*

### *Notable Lack of Progress in the Ministry of Interior*

- *Lack of Police Disciplinary Code*
- *Lack of functioning retirement policy*

- ✓ *Draft Police Disciplinary Code awaiting approval by CoR*
- ✓ *Retirement law passed 27 January 2006, but not implemented*

## *Issues*



- ***Extra-Governmental Armed Groups***
  - ✓ ***Militias***
  - ✓ ***Facilities Protection Service***
  - ✓ ***Protective Service Detachments***
- ***ISF Health Care***

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


# ***Iraqi Security Forces Update***

***26 April 2006***


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## Generation of Key Army Enablers




- **Logistics = Motor Transport Regiments Formed**
- **Leaders = Officer Generation at TRA Level 1**
- **Communications = Signal Companies Formed**

☆ = TRA Level 1 Capacity







~~OVERALL CLASSIFICATION//C RET/REL TO USA, AUS, GBR~~

SDBA




**Secretary of Defense**

**26 April 2006**

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## Security



## AQIZ CAMPAIGN OF MURDER AND INTIMIDATION


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## Ramadi

### PLANNED OPERATIONS IN RAMADI

- MNF-W (I MEF)
- 3 x Iraqi Army Brigade, 2 x Coalition Force Brigade (-)
- Integrated CMO (governance and economic)

Monthly Effective Attacks in Ramadi  
1 Nov 04 - 21 Apr 06



Source: INEC, I FusionNet 25 Apr 06

### SET CONDITIONS FOR

- Insert Iraqi Police Presence – 2,157 police by July
- 11 police stations, Development for Iraq Funds used
- Set conditions for provincial governance
- 13 Major CERP Projects (\$31million)

SECRET//CFI/MR



# Economic Development

## Commanders Emergency Relief Program (CERP)

- ✓ Provides targeted effects at the tactical level
- ✓ Immediate results for local populace
- ✓ \$1.5 Billion since OIF I

## New 40" Crude Oil Pipeline

- ✓ Kirkuk - Bayji

## Micro-Finance Institutions

- ✓ Source of loans
- ✓ Create and Improve micro-businesses

Micro-Finance Institutions  
planned in  
Samarra, Irbil, Ramadi,  
Diwaniyah, Kut, Basrah

Micro-Finance Institutions  
open in  
Baghdad, Fallujah, Kirkuk

Business Center  
Training

Training in  
Jordan

August  
2006

**Focused  
Stabilization**

July  
2006

## MNC-I Iraqi Economic Initiative

- ✓ Supports US Government initiatives
- ✓ Nested with MNF-I Focused Stabilization
- ✓ Improve job opportunities
- ✓ Leverages resources and inter-agency coordination towards key cities

June  
2006

**MNC-I Iraqi Economic Initiative  
Economic Consultant  
Contract Awarded**

## Crop Spraying Initiative

- ✓ Will result in improved harvest quality, volume, and internal food production
- ✓ Creates job opportunities and improves economic conditions

Date Palm Spraying  
Wheat Spraying

May  
2006


## Hateen Bus/Tractor Factory

- ✓ SOE Initiative

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## Health Clinics




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# Iraqi Security Forces Transition


## January 2007 Projection

### Iraqi Army Lead (IAL)



Battalions IAL	101
Brigades IAL	34
Divisions IAL	10

### Iraqi Police Lead



Level I	
Level II	
Level III	
Level IV	

	Jan
Provinces TRA 2 or better	17
Key Cities TRA 2 or better	9

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


## Communicating



GOI LEGITIMATE IN EYES OF THE PEOPLE

- Representative Government
- Sense of Nation
- Hope and Normalcy
- Support Economic Reforms
- Terrorists Defeated
- Meet Basic Needs of the People
- Capable ISF
  - Blue shirts in the street
  - Sound Army Institution



TV Spots Played	Radio Broadcasts	Opinion Editorials Printed	Posters
12,577	14,599	9,941	245,868


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## Weekly IED Trends

3 July 2004 – 21 April 2006



Source: MNC-I FusionNet 22 Apr 06


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## Counter IED Measures of Effectiveness

Over 35,000 total IED events in 36 months


Avg CFCas/Det
Jun-Dec03: 0.95
Jan-Jun04: 0.79
Jul-Dec04: 0.62
Jan-Jun05: 0.44
Jul-Dec05: 0.39
Jan-Apr06: 0.27



- Effectiveness of IED attacks decreased from 20% to 18% since Nov 05 (7% against CF, 5% against ISF, 6% against Civ)
  - Armor additions
  - CREW employment
  - Blue TTP improvements
  - Identification of enemy TTP

Avg Dets/Week
Jun-Dec03: 43.4
Jan-Jun04: 72.5
Jul-Dec04: 130.7
Jan-Jun05: 162.2
Jul-Dec05: 233.1
Jan-Apr06: 222.6

- Increase in Found/Cleared IEDs from 34% (Jun/Oct 05) to 44% (Nov 05/Feb 06)
  - Enhanced awareness
  - Experience
  - Training
  - Synchronization of assets
  - C-IED Fusion Cells
  - Improved information sharing
  - Refocusing C-IED training



Consistency of IED events dictates the system and not the device must be targeted

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1.4a, 1.4g

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## ***Key Take-Aways***

- The Iraqi Army is tactically sound, but is a fragile organization.
- Iraqi Ministerial capacity is the key to our success.
- Our focus in the next 9 months is the MOI – Year of the Police.
- IEDs continue to be the greatest threat to coalition forces.
  - New Counter-RCIED Electronic Warfare equipment fielding and integration is challenging.
  - Counter-RCIED Electronic Warfare equipment must be fully tested prior to delivery and fielding in the theater of operations.
- ISR coverage and availability must remain constant.

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***Back Up Slides***

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
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1.4a, 1.4g, (b)(6)

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# IED Activity 180 Day Look



As of 25 APR 06

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



## ***MNC-I Support to Governance***

- **Provide personnel for Ministry Assistance Teams to develop capacity of Iraqi ministries and enhance coordination**
- **Provide personnel and equipment for PRTs to develop governance capacity at the provincial and local levels**
- **Provide aerial spraying for Date Palms and Wheat to strengthen agricultural economy and enhance credibility of Government by delivering on a promise broken last year**
- **Assist GOI (IECI) in the planning for provincial election support to preserve the legitimacy and momentum of Government of Iraq**
- **Develop improvement programs focused on restoring essential services and future disposition of state-owned enterprises to enhance credibility of Government of Iraq**
- **Support Government of Iraq in reestablishing Rule of Law (courts, judges and prisons) to improve security**


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
# Iraqi Police Transition

## April 2006 – January 2007

Apr 06



Jan 07



Level I
Level II
Level III
Level IV


	Apr
Provinces TRA 2 or better	7
Key Cities TRA 2 or better	1

	Jan
Provinces TRA 2 or better	17
Key Cities TRA 2 or better	9

# Iraqi Army Transition


April 2006 – January 2007

Apr 06



Divisions IAL	52
Brigades IAL	14
Battalions IAL	2

Jan 07







Battalions IAL	101
Brigades IAL	34
Divisions IAL	10

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# IED Attack Threat Boxes

## Target Areas of Interest (TAIs)



THREAT BOX #1 – MSR TAMPA CP 59A

THREAT BOX #2 – ASR SWORD/VERNON

THREAT BOX #3 – ASR JACKSON/TAMPA

~~SECRET~~ REL MGFI//X1



SD BR/15/09

SD BR/15/09

# DETENTION OPERATIONS UPDATE

27 April 2006

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## ***BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT***

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- TRANSITION PROGRESSING BUT OBSTACLES REMAIN
- IRAQI CORRECTIONS SYSTEM IS CURRENTLY TOO IMMATURE TO EFFECTIVELY RUN US FACILITIES AT APPROPRIATE STANDARD
- CHANGES IMPLEMENTED OVER LAST 4 MONTHS HAVE IMPROVED DETENTION, REVIEW, AND RELEASE PROCEDURES



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## POPULATION HISTORY

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


## POPULATION SUMMARY

14,711 IN THEATER FACILITIES

SHIA 6.5% (966)

OTHER 1.8% (242)




SUNNI 91.7 (13,503)

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# TRANSITION TIMELINE



★ - TRANSITION POINT IN PROGRAM

★ - EVENT

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## **TRANSITION TAKEAWAY**

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- IRAQI ABILITY TO MANAGE BUCCA WITHOUT US ASSISTANCE IS QUESTIONABLE
- CAMP BUCCA POPULATION AT END CY 2006 WILL LIKELY REQUIRE US DETAINEE TRANSITION TEAM AND US BN (-) THROUGH 2007
- US DETAINEE TRANSITION TEAM TIME IN ALL THREE CAMPS WILL EXCEED THE ORIGINAL 6-MONTH PROJECTION
- THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL LIKELY PRESS US TO CONFORM TO IRAQI CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

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## **JOINT DETAINEE COMMITTEE**

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- ESTABLISHED BY CPA MEMORANDUM 3
- REVIEWS ALL INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AFTER 30 JUNE 2004
- APPROVED BY PRIME MINISTER AND CG, MNF-I
- RESULTS TO DATE:

### **FEBRUARY SESSION**

REVIEWED - 104

RETAINED - 99

RELEASED - 5

### **MARCH SESSION**

REVIEWED - 112

RETAINED - 98

RELEASED - 14

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## **PROCEDURAL CHANGES**

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- ESTABLISHED A LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH RISK SCREEN AND SEQUENCED LOW RISK FILES THROUGH REVIEW BOARD
- INITIATED AN EXPEDITED RELEASE PROGRAM TO RELEASE BENIGN DETAINEES IN FIRST 30 DAYS
- INCREASED NUMBER OF RELEASES FROM 650 to 1100 PER MONTH AVERAGE ... FOCUSING ON LOW RISK FILES
- INCREASED REVIEW BOARDS FROM 2 TO 4 PER WEEK
- INCREASE NUMBER OF COURT INVESTIGATIVE HEARINGS FROM 10 to 50 PER WEEK IN MAR – AVERAGING 100 PER WEEK IN APR
- WRITTEN NOTIFICATION PROVIDED TO DETAINEES
- ESTABLISHED COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE COMPOUNDS
- ESTABLISHED REINTEGRATION PROGRAM (NEWS, SPEAKERS, CLASSES, SPONSORS)

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## GOVT PROGRAM POINT 31

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**“FORMING A FORMAL COMMISSION ... RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GUARDIANSHIP OF ALL DETAINEES INCLUDING THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF INNOCENT PEOPLE, SENDING THEM TO COURTS WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THEIR DETENTION, ENCOURAGING ALL IRAQI AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO VISIT DETENTION FACILITIES AND MEET THE DETAINEES.... “**

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## **GOVERNMENT FORMATION RELEASE**

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- **RELEASE 2000-3000 LOW RISK DETAINEES**
- **CONDUCT IN LATE MAY/EARLY JUNE**

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## ***DETENTION STRATEGIC ISSUES***

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- **IRAQI LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD SECURITY DETAINEES AND TRANSFER TO IRAQI CONTROL**
- **DECISION TO PASS PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE HIGH VALUE CRIMINALS (HVCS) TO THE IRAQIS**
- **HOW TO ADDRESS NON-REFOULMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**
- **RESOLUTION OF MEK/PMOI AT ASHRAF**

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# GUIDANCE

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# BACKUP SLIDES

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## **CRITERIA FOR TRANSFER**

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- **IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS LEGAL AUTHORITY TO HOLD SECURITY DETAINEES**
- **FACILITIES ARE UNDER THE DIRECTION/SUPERVISION OF THE IRAQI MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (MOJ)**
- **GOI HAS DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE THE OPERATION OF EACH FACILITY (ADEQUATE FUNDING, LOGISTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, DETAINEE MEDICAL CARE, EXTERNAL DEFENSE, ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, HUMANE TREATMENT, FEEDING, ...)**
- **WE HAVE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED THE NON-REFOULMENT REQUIREMENT**

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## **ABU GHRAIB CLOSURE**

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### **CONDITIONS:**

- **CAMP CROPPER CONSTRUCTION COMPLETE (APR 06)**
- **FIRST CAMP BUCCA EXPANSION COMPOUND COMPLETE (MID-JUNE 06)**

### **KEY MILESTONES:**

- **30 DAYS TO COMPLETE DETAINEE AND JIDC TRANSFER**
- **15 DAYS TO COMPLETE TRANSFER OF ABU GHRAIB TO THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (MOJ)**

**PROJECTED 15 JULY 06 = CLOSURE AND TRANSFER OF ABU GHRAIB**

Pages 72 through 74 redacted for the following reasons:

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1.4a

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## RELEASE STRATEGY CONCEPT

### GOALS...

- SUPPORT FOCUSED OBJECTIVES AS DIRECTED BY THE CG, AMBASSADOR, OR STRATEFFECTS (ANBAR PROVINCE EFFORT, NATIONAL UNITY, ... )
- SUPPORT THE DUE PROCESS EFFORT
- REDUCE EXPOSURE OF BENIGN DETAINEES TO EXTREME ISLAM AND INSURGENT RECRUITERS
- RETAIN HIGH THREATS TO IRAQI SECURITY AND THE COALITION
- SUPPORT THE CLOSURE OF ABU GHRAIB
- SUPPORT THE TRANSITION OF THE FACILITIES TO THE IRAQIS AT NORMAL POPULATION CAPACITY

### KEY SUPPORTING TASKS...

- ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE CRRB/REINTIGRATION/RELEASE BATTLE RHYTHM THAT:
  - ESTABLISHES THE CRRB DOCKET 21 DAYS PRIOR TO CRRB
  - PROVIDES UNITS/C2 NOTIFICATION 18 DAYS BEFORE CRRB
  - PROVIDES THE UNIT/DPM FINAL RELEASE LISTS BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION 14 DAYS BEFORE RELEASE
  - MOVES DETAINEES TO ABU ON SCHEDULE
- TRANSITION FROM THE GUARANTOR TO SPONSOR IN APR
- CONDUCT FIRST CRRB REVIEW WITHIN 90 DAYS OF DETENTION FOR ALL DETAINEES AND IDENTIFY LIMITED EVIDENCE/LOW RISK CASES FOR POTENTIAL RELEASE
- EXECUTE AN EXPEDITED RELEASE REVIEW AT THE MAGISTRATE CELL AT ABU
- RESPOND TO SPECIAL RELEASES IN A TIMELY MANNER
- RELEASE CCCI DISMISSALS AND ACQUITTALS IN A TIMELY MANNER
- EFFECTIVELY TRACK AQIZ DETAINEES TO ENSURE THEY ARE NOT ACCIDENTALLY RELEASED